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There is no provision for the suspension of a prison sentence in Scotland. 
Courts have the option of either a custodial sentence or a community sanction.1 
This article addresses the gray area between custody and community sanctions—
usually called the custody threshold. 
When does an offense or a case become so serious that a custodial sentence 
is necessary? Scholarship on the custody threshold has focused on the lack of 
definitional clarity in statute and case law and has proposed a range of legal and 
jurisprudential reforms. This article suggests that the custody threshold is a social 
practice that distributes marginal cases to either custody or community sanctions. 
Drawing on two empirical studies in Scotland, this article argues that the custody 
threshold is produced by criminal justice professionals who share unarticulated 
understandings of deserved punishments. 
II 
COMMUNITY SANCTIONS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CUSTODY 
Like many other jurisdictions, Scotland has addressed the problem of over-
imprisonment by trying to encourage the courts to make greater use of 
community sanctions. In the early 2000’s, during the first Scottish Parliament, the 
Parliament’s Justice Committee published a report expressing concern at the 
ineffectiveness of short prison sentences.2 The report reflected the evidence 
submitted to the review from a wide range of organizations and individuals and 
made a number of recommendations for reform.3 Although no legislation 
emerged directly from this review, the proportionate use of community sanctions 
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 1.  A custodial sentence is a sentence imposing imprisonment. A community sanction is an order 
consisting of community service, required treatment, required classes, or another non-custodial 
obligation. 
 2.  JUSTICE 1 COMMITTEE, INQUIRY INTO ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY, VOL. 1 (2003). 
 3.  Neil Hutton, Toward a Sentencing Policy for the Use of Short Prison Sentences in Scotland, 4 
JURIDICAL REV. 313, 313–14 (2003) (stating that many parties, like the Scottish Consortium on Crime 
and Criminal Justice and Criminal Justice Forum, submitted evidence to the Justice 1 Committee 
expressing concern about the “limited effectiveness of short prison sentences” and that the report made 
“many recommendations, intended to increase the use of non-custodial sentences as alternatives”). 
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has increased steadily.4 In 2008, for the first time, the proportionate use of 
community sanctions exceeded the proportionate use of imprisonment.5 This 
trend has continued.6 In 2008–09, custodial sentences accounted for 13% of 
penalties passed by Scottish Courts, and community sanctions for 14%.7 In 2015–
16, custodial sentences accounted for 14% of penalties and community sanctions 
for 19%.8 So, although there has been a steady growth in the use of community 
sentences, the proportionate use of imprisonment by the courts has remained 
steady. Despite increases in community sentences, persuading those involved in 
sentencing decisions to use community sanctions as a direct alternative to short 
custodial sentences remains challenging. How can the custody threshold be 
shifted upwards? 
The most recent attempt by the Scottish Government to reduce imprisonment 
was contained in the Criminal Justice and Licensing Act.9 The Act introduced a 
statutory presumption against the use of custodial sentences of three months or 
less;10 and the Act introduced a new community sanction, the Community 
Payback Order, that combined the punitive or reparative requirement of unpaid 
work, or both, with a range of other requirements designed to reduce illegal 
behavior.11 The Scottish Government published an evaluation of these reforms 
in March, 2015.12 
  
 
 4.  OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS, SCOTTISH GOV’T, CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN 
SCOTLAND, 2016–2017 59 (2017), https://www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00532010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BGR8-J6WN] (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (showing, in Table 7(b), a proportional increase 
in community sentencing from 2007–08 to 2016–17). 
 5.  Id. (showing in Table 7(b) the Community Sentence proportion of 14% exceeding the 13% 
Custody proportion in 2008). 
 6.  Id. (showing in Table 7(b) that the Community Sentence proportion has exceeded the Custody 
proportion for every year in the report since 2008). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, (ASP 13) § 17 (“A court must not pass 
a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 3 months or less on a person unless . . . no other method is 
appropriate.”). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See id. at § 14. 
 12.  SCOTTISH GOV’T SOCIAL RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY PAYBACK ORDERS, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOCIAL WORK REPORTS AND THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST SHORT SENTENCES 
(2015) [hereinafter SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION]. 
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Table 1: Prison Sentences of up to Two Years Imposed in the Scottish Courts, 
2010–2015 13 
 
 Total  Less than 3 
months  
From 3 months to less 
than 6 months  
From 6 months to 
less than 2 years  
n  n  % of 
total  
n  % of total  n  % of total  
2010–
2011  
15256  5324  35  5220  34  3436  23  
2011–
2012  
15874  4516  28  6149  39  3908  25  
2012–
2013  
14748  4334  29  5470  37  3804  26  
2013–
2014 
14,079 4,126 29 5,214 37 3,539 25 
2014–
2015 
13,977 4,092 29 5,225 37 3,587 26 
2015–
2016 
13,724 4,066 30 4,850 35 3,730 27 
 
The use of sentences of less than three months declined initially, but the use 
of sentences between three and six months, and between six months and two 
years both increased.14 This pattern is consistent with longer-term trends that pre-
date the reforms, but it appears likely that at least some sheriffs have imposed 
longer sentences as a result of the presumption against sentences of less than 
three months.15 In any event, it seems clear that the reforms have not entirely 
shifted sentencing practices away from short prison sentences to community 
sanctions.16 This suggests that the custody threshold remains stubborn and very 
difficult to shift. 
Maybe the problem has something to do with the concept of the custody 
 
 13.  This exhibit is comprised of data pulled from tables published Dec. 2011, Nov. 2012, Nov. 2013, 
Dec. 2014, Feb. 2016, and Jan. 2017, available at the listed URL. SCOTTISH GOV’T, DATASETS – 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN SCOTLAND, https://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Crime-
Justice/Datasets/DatasetsCrimProc [https://perma.cc/7XND-4EGX] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  See id. (showing that after the implementation of the presumption against three-month 
sentences, sentences greater than 3 months increased, while sentences of less than 3 months decreased). 
 16.  See id. (showing the aggregate shift of sentences from less than three months to those greater 
than three months after the implementation of the statutory presumption); OFFICE FOR NATIONAL 
STATISTICS, SCOTTISH GOV’T, CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN SCOTLAND, 2016–2017 59 (2017), 
https://www.gov.scot/Resource/0053/00532010.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU3E-CCH9] (last visited Oct. 2, 
2018) (showing that the percentage of custodies compared to all penalties has remained roughly static 
despite the increase in community sanctions). 
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threshold itself. Von Hirsch and Ashworth have argued that the concept needs 
to be defined more clearly and precisely.17 Padfield has argued that the concept 
of the custody threshold has itself hindered the greater use of community 
sanctions as a replacement for short prison sentences.18 She suggests that the term 
should be abandoned.19 This article takes another look at the concept of the 
custody threshold. What does this idea of a custody threshold mean in practice? 
What does the use of custody as a last resort mean to judges? Why is it so difficult 
to shift sentencing practices from custody to the community? 
III 
THE CUSTODY THRESHOLD 
Padfield locates the origins of the custody threshold concept in English and 
Welsh legal discourse.20 The Criminal Justice Act of 1991 set out a principled 
approach to sentencing.21 Proportionality was to be the primary rationale for 
sentencing; sentences should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense.22 
Other aims of sentencing, such as deterrence, incapacitation, or reform, could 
continue to be pursued but only within the limits set by the principle of 
proportionality.23 Commenting on the Act, Ashworth and Von Hirsch argued 
that sanctions should be seen as stacked in a pyramid, with thresholds that would 
have to be crossed to move from one type of sanction to another.24 The custody 
threshold was one of these thresholds.  
The concept of a custody threshold refers to a notional line in the sand. On 
one side lie sentences of imprisonment, on the other, community sanctions. While 
there are notional thresholds for both financial penalties and community 
sanctions, there is something distinctive about the custody threshold. A custodial 
sentence has some characteristics that differentiate it from a community 
sentence. Most importantly, it imposes unavoidable consequences. A custodial 
sanction deprives offenders of their liberty and excludes them from society. 
Contained in prison, the prisoner cannot avoid the consequences of the sanction. 
A community order may impose restrictions on liberty and require the 
performance of particular tasks, but offenders may choose not to comply with 
 
 17.  Andrew Ashworth & Andrew Von Hirsch, Recognising Elephants: The Problem of the Custody 
Threshold, CRIM. L. REV. 187, 199–200 (1997) (critiquing the pre-Criminal Justice and Licensing Act 
judicial approach to the custody threshold). 
 18.  Nicola Padfield, Time to Bury the Custody “Threshold”?, CRIM. L. REV. 593, 610 (2011). 
 19.  Id. at 611–12. 
 20.  Id. at 593–99. 
 21.  See Criminal Justice Act 1991, c. 53, § 1(2) (UK) (repealed 2000) (“[T]he court shall not pass a 
custodial sentence on the offender unless . . . the offence . . . was so serious that only such a sentence can 
be justified for the offence; or . . . the offence is a violent or sexual offence, that only such a sentence 
would be adequate to protect the public from serious harm from him.”). 
 22.  Id. at § 2(2)(a). 
 23.  Padfield, supra note 18 (quoting Andrew Von Hirsh & Martin Wasik, Section 29 Revised: 
Previous Convictions in Sentencing, CRIM. L. REV. 409 (1994)). 
 24.  Ashworth & Von Hirsch, supra note 17, at 197. 
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these requirements, albeit that monitoring procedures will call them to account 
and impose further sanctions. The consequences of a prison sentence are 
unavoidable. This may seem obvious, but the difference may help us understand 
more about how criminal justice actors conceive of the custody threshold. 
A. Defining the Custody Threshold 
The term “custody threshold” has become widespread in both court 
judgments and academic writing.25 It has also been used in sentencing guidelines 
published by the Sentencing Guidelines Council and its successor, the Sentencing 
Council.26 The 2004 guideline states that custody is to be reserved for the most 
serious offenses.27 However, if the custody threshold has been crossed, the court 
should consider whether there are mitigating factors and only pass a custodial 
sanction if it is unavoidable.28 
The custody threshold has also been incorporated into a number of 
Magistrates’ Courts’ guidelines. For example, the guideline on assault states that 
“[w]hen sentencing . . . offences, the court should also consider the custody 
threshold.”29 Specifically, the court should consider whether the custody 
threshold has been passed, whether the imposition of a custodial sentence is 
unavoidable, and whether the sentence can be suspended.”30 The guidelines on 
handling goods and shop theft state that a persistent criminal record may cause 
the custody threshold to be crossed even though the seriousness of the offense 
alone might place the case below the custody threshold.31 
Padfield argues that attempts to define the custody threshold in caselaw and 
guidelines are insufficiently precise.32 Cases straddle the threshold, and decisions 
about whether custody or community sanctions are appropriate remain opaque 
and overly subjective.33 Padfield argues that Court of Appeal decisions have not 
been helpful; “[a]ny number of practical examples could be offered from the case 
law to illustrate how little assistance is gained from the concept of the ‘custody 
threshold.’ . . . The precise position of the ‘threshold’ continues to confuse, 
because there is no such precise line.” 34 Padfield complains that there is no 
objective legal definition of the custody threshold that can be operationalized.35 
 
 25.  Padfield, supra note 18, at 593. 
 26.  Id. at 599. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  SENTENCING COUNCIL, MAGISTRATES’ COURT SENTENCING GUIDELINES, COMMON 
ASSAULT/RACIALLY OR RELIGIOUSLY AGGRAVATED COMMON ASSAULT (2018), 
https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/offences/item/common-assault-racially-religiously-aggravated-
common-assault/ [https://perma.cc/FG6E-LGRP]. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Padfield, supra note 18, at 601. 
 32.  Id. at 600. 
 33.  Id. at 600–02. 
 34.  Id. at 604. 
 35.  Id. at 610 (“It is submitted that the ‘threshold’ does not help decide hard cases.”). 
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This may well be the case, but in the daily practice of the courts, offenders are 
sent to prison for short sentences because the threshold has ostensibly been 
crossed. The custody threshold may be vague but, at the same time, it is real and 
has significant practical consequences. 
Statutes also provide an extremely vague definition of the custody threshold.36 
Although the courts have adopted the term and used it frequently, this has not 
clarified the definition.  
Roberts and Harris have recently proposed a four step methodology for 
decisions about the custody threshold.37 Step One reviews the harm and 
culpability of the offense to measure seriousness in line with the primary principle 
of proportionality.38 Only when the offense is so serious that only a custodial 
sentence is appropriate will the custody threshold be deemed to have been 
crossed. Step Two considers aggravating and mitigating factors, including the 
absence of a criminal record, which is known as first offender mitigation.39 After 
Steps One and Two, the court resolves whether the sentence is custodial or non-
custodial; Steps Three and Four only “extend the term of custody or enhance the 
punitiveness of the non-custodial sanction.”40 Step Three takes account of the 
criminal record of the accused. Step Four discounts for a plea of guilty.41 Roberts 
and Harris argue that neither Step Three nor Step Four should be allowed to shift 
an offense across the threshold.42 The presence of a criminal record should only 
alter the severity of the custodial or community sanction.43 This is a significant 
change. Although it is not possible to provide exact quantitative evidence, 
Roberts and Harris argue that, from an analysis of theft sentencing, it seems 
highly likely that a significant proportion of offenders convicted of relatively less 
serious theft offenses receive a custodial sentence because of their criminal 
record.44 A discount for a plea of guilty, having nothing to do with the 
proportionate seriousness of the offense, should also not bring a case below the 
custody threshold, but only reduce the severity of the custodial sentence within 
the guideline range.45 
B. Case or Offense? 
Crossing the custody threshold requires an offense to reach a particular level 
 
 36.  See id. at 604 (“[I]t is enough to suggest that the concept of ‘custody threshold’ does not appear 
to offer sentencers clarity or help.”). 
 37.  Julian V. Roberts & Lyndon Harris, Reconceptualising the Custody Threshold in England and 
Wales, 28 CRIM. L. F. 477, 496 (2017). 
 38.  Id. at 497. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 497–98. 
 42.  Id. at 498. 
 43.  Id. at 497–98. 
 44.  Id. at 491–92. 
 45.  Id. at 497–98. 
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of seriousness. One of the issues identified by Padfield46 and more recently by 
Roberts and Harris47 is that it is not clear whether the custody threshold is 
properly defined in terms of the seriousness of the offense or in terms of the 
seriousness of the case as a whole. For desert theorists, seriousness is defined by 
the harm caused and the degree of culpability of the offender.48 Thus, the criminal 
record of the offender should, strictly speaking, not form part of the assessment 
of the seriousness of the offense. In practice, however, the offender’s criminal 
record will almost always factor into the seriousness of the offense.49 Thinking of 
the custody threshold as a line in the sand defined by only the seriousness of the 
specific offense is thus unlikely to be a realistic approach. 
In R. v. Bradbourn, Lawton L.J. famously argued that the “courts can 
recognise an elephant when they see one, but may not find it necessary to define 
it.”50 In response, Von Hirsch and Ashworth set out a case for a more principled 
definition of the “elephant” that is the custody threshold.51 They argue that 
assessing seriousness is an unavoidably comparative process.52 Cases are more or 
less serious than other cases. Treating cases as unique and deciding each case on 
its own facts and circumstances leads to “virtually unreviewable discretion.”53 
They instead suggest following the existing practice of the Court of Appeal by 
thinking about “standard cases.”54 A standard drug case might be characterized 
by the amount of drugs, a rape case by the presence of a shared set of common 
factors, et cetera.55 The court then examines the case at hand to assess whether 
the case is more or less serious than the standard case by considering aggravating 
and mitigating factors relating to the offense and the offender.56 In assessing 
whether a case crosses the custody threshold, Von Hirsch and Ashworth argue 
that the custody threshold “ought to operate chiefly to keep cases out of custody 
unless there are aggravating factors that take a case above the threshold.”57 They 
give examples of cases of property offending, burglary (housebreaking), and also 
less serious sexual offenses that they argue should normally, that is in standard 
 
 46.  See Padfield, supra note 18, at 611 (suggesting that judges do not rely on fixed ideas of 
seriousness of offenses that cross the threshold because the threshold is unclear, but instead judges rely 
on the specific factors of the case). 
 47.  Roberts & Harris, supra note 37, at 488. 
 48.  See id. at 489 (stating that the statutory definition of seriousness of the offense focuses on 
culpability and harm and that the statutory definition reflects a desert-based approach). 
 49.  See id. at 490 (explaining that in some criminal cases, the gravity of the offender’s crime is 
insufficient to move the case across the custody threshold, but consideration of his prior convictions leads 
to a custodial sentence anyway). 
 50.  R. v. Bradbourn (1985) 7 Cr. App. R. (S) 180, 182. 
 51. Ashworth & Von Hirsch, supra note 37. 
 52.  Id. at 192–93. 
 53.  Id. at 193. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 198. 
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cases, not cross the custody threshold without the presence of significant 
aggravating factors.58 
IV 
THE CUSTODY THRESHOLD IN SCOTLAND 
There has been little academic attention given to the concept of a custody 
threshold in Scotland. However, although the concept is not commonly studied, 
the issues about how to define the boundary between custodial and community 
sanctions remains relevant. In Scotland “[a] court must not pass a sentence of 
imprisonment for a term of 3 months or less on a person unless the court 
considers that no other method of dealing with the person is appropriate.”59 
Custody is thus the sanction of last resort. There is, however, little jurisprudence 
attempting to define what the last resort means in practice. The definition is not 
based on offense seriousness alone. The focus is on the appropriateness of the 
sanction, but for what purpose or purposes? There is no statutory statement of 
sentencing purposes in Scots law, although the familiar purposes of retribution, 
rehabilitation, protection of the public, reparation, and others are generally held 
to serve as appropriate justifications for sentencing. 
A. The Custody Threshold as a Shared Justice System Cultural Understanding  
Studies in England and Wales and in Scotland involved reporting the findings 
of interviews with individual judges about their perceptions of the custody 
threshold.60 Both studies found that judges claimed to use custody only as a last 
resort when cases were so serious that no other sanction was suitable.61 The term 
custody threshold thus appears to refer to a notional stage in the sentencing 
decision-making process when the sentencer somehow becomes aware that a 
custodial sentence may be unavoidable. This conception is based on a particular 
way of thinking about the sentencer decision-making process. Sentencing is 
conceived as a decision made by an individual judge who deploys cognitive 
processes in unspecified ways to analyze the facts and circumstances of the case. 
I have recently argued elsewhere that sentencing should be understood as a 
process involving a number of criminal justice actors and not just individual 
judges.62 Judges formally make the authoritative decision in court, but that does 
not mean that they can be held solely responsible for the series of practices by 
criminal justice actors that contribute to a final sentencing decision. This is not to 
 
 58.  Id. at 198–99. 
 59.  Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, (ASP 13) § 17. 
 60.  Andrew Millie et al., Borderline Sentencing: A Comparison of Sentencers’ Decision Making in 
England and Wales, and Scotland, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 243, 251–54 (2007); Jacqueline Tombs 
& Elizabeth Jagger, Denying Responsibility, 46 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 803, 814–818 (2006). 
 61. Id. at 819. 
 62.  Neil Hutton, Visible and Invisible Sentencing, in MODERNISATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
CHAIN AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 145 (Annie Hondeghem et al. eds., 2016). 
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argue that judges play no part in the decision-making, nor that judges do not 
exercise discretion. However, they do so as one of a number of actors engaged in 
generating sentencing decisions, not as the sole decision-makers. Sentencing 
decision-making should not therefore be conceived of as a series of cognitive 
functions performed by an individual judge. 
In particular, social workers writing pre-sentence reports play an important 
role in sentencing.63 The responsibility for presenting Community Payback 
Orders and Restriction of Liberty Orders at sentencing options rests with social 
workers. They are responsible for presenting the court with sentencing options. 
While social workers do not normally recommend a sentence, as this is seen as a 
formal judicial function, they clearly play an important role in sentencing. For 
instance, one sheriff interviewed stated: 
You can defer sentence for good behaviour for a person for a short while, with a bad 
record, and say, ‘Well, if you are of good behaviour, I may consider a CPO’. If he comes 
back, and has been of good behaviour. . . but if the criminal justice team come back and 
say, ‘No. We can’t actually work with this man,’ then . . . there’s very little to go on.64 
Research on writing social enquiry reports suggested that social workers are 
well aware that they are not supposed to recommend a sentence but are often 
very careful in their use of language to try to communicate their preference for 
an option without an overt recommendation. Equally, social workers can also use 
language to suggest to the court that there is no viable community sanction 
available, which is a euphemistic way of recognizing that a short custodial 
sentence appears inevitable.65 
Report writers therefore play an important role in identifying the custody 
threshold; it is not only a judicial task. Report writers experience tension between 
their professional commitment to the welfare of their clients and their role as 
providers of information to the court. This can usefully be understood as a form 
of “edgework.”66 In the absence of any rules specifying the criteria that lead to 
either a community sanction or a custodial sentence, report writers are sometimes 
unsure whether the court will perceive a community sanction as realistic.67 An 
element of risk-taking is unavoidable; yet, the desire to achieve the best outcome 
for their client might compromise report writers’ reputation in the eyes of the 
 
 63.  See id. at 149 (“The account provided [by the social worker] in the [pre-sentencing report] 
performs a significant part of the work of sentencing. It is a further translation of the prosecution case 
into a . . . relatively narrow range of potential sentencing outcomes.”). 
 64.  SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION, supra note 12, at 128 (quoting a Sheriff Judge 
interview). 
 65.  See Fergus McNeill et al., Risk, Responsibility and Reconfiguration: Penal Adaptation and 
Misadaptation, 11 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 419, 428 (2009). 
 66.  Anne Worrall, Grace under Pressure: The Role of Courage in the Future of Probation Work, 54 
HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 508, 512 (2015). 
 67.  Cf. Simon Halliday et al., Shadow Writing and Participant Observation: A Study of Criminal 
Justice Social Work Around Sentencing, 35 J. L. & SOC’Y 189 (2008) (“By developing a reasonably 
coherent narrative about the offender they attempted to lead the judge as reader to the narrative’s logical 
conclusion.”). 
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court. Experienced social workers thus develop a sense of what the custody 
threshold means in practice that, it seems, is broadly shared by judges and other 
regular court actors. Hawkins68 describes this unarticulated, unthinking 
professional knowledge as “mutuality”; Bourdieu69 describes it as “habitus.” 
Worrall argues that probation workers share an occupational culture that 
includes shared values and a sense of “how things are done around here.”70 The 
work by Halliday, et al. provides some evidence that a common working culture 
is shared by different professionals working in the criminal justice system.71 
Although social workers and judges may have competing interests and 
viewpoints, each party considers the other party’s perceptions and seeks to reach 
an outcome consistent with their common understanding of the overall criminal 
justice system. 
I think there’s . . . traditionally been a disparity in approach. Social Workers think 
Sheriffs want to send people into prison, and Sheriffs think Social Workers will say 
anything to keep them out of prison. And so you . . . go in with that allowance 
perhaps. . . . So you have a slightly different reference point, but, again, you take that 
on board and you carry on. It doesn’t mean you can’t come to a view. It’s just a factor 
in the whole decision-making process.72 
Sudnow described the “institutionalized . . . common orientation [towards] 
allowable reductions” that developed between district attorneys and defense 
lawyers to facilitate plea bargaining.73 Sudnow’s practitioners share broad 
narratives of “typical” cases—those with which they deal in some quantity day 
after day.74 While practitioners will say that they “know” what these typical cases 
are, they are not able to provide objective definitions of typical cases. Thus, 
within these typifications, there is a scope of variation. It is often easier to identify 
an unusual case than to accurately define a typical case. As Sudnow points out, 
the cases that cause difficulty do not fit a type or occur so rarely that there is 
insufficient data to construct typifications.75 Sheriffs, social workers, and other 
 
 68.  See Keith Hawkins, Order, Rationality and Silence: Some Reflections on Criminal Justice 
Decision-Making, in EXERCISING DISCRETION: DECISION-MAKING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
AND BEYOND 186 (Loraine Gelsthorpe & Nicola Padfield eds., 2003). 
 69.  PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 72 (1977) (“The structures 
constitutive of a particular type of environment . . . produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions . . . objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and . . . collectively orchestrated without 
being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.”). 
 70.  Worrall, supra note 66, at 514. 
 71.  See Halliday, supra note 67, at 212 (concluding that social workers acted with professional 
sentencing judgment, typically only expected of judges, beyond their regulatory responsibilities within 
the criminal justice system by developing influential reports for the judges to understand “the basic thrust 
of a social worker’s narrative”). 
 72.  SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION, supra note 12, at 131 (quoting a Sheriff Judge 
interview). 
 73.  David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defender 
Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 258 (1965). 
 74.  Id. at 260. 
 75.  Id. at 261. 
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court practitioners share an understanding of typical cases where, although the 
seriousness of the offense does not appear on its face to require a custodial 
sentence, other considerations such as criminal record, homelessness, or 
substance abuse mean that a custodial sentence is unavoidable. 
The traditional judicial account of individualized sentencing conceives of a 
judge attaching notional weights to facts and circumstances, both aggravating and 
mitigating, and drawing up a balance sheet that ascribes a measure of seriousness 
to the case and thus indicates the appropriate sanction. On this account, the 
custody threshold is crossed when this series of imaginary calculations produces 
the appropriate level of seriousness. While this makes logical sense, it remains an 
untested hypothesis based on the assumption that sentencing decision-making 
can be characterized as a series of cognitive processes undertaken by an 
individual actor. The difficulty is that researchers have no access to these internal 
processes. Nor are there visible traces of these practices. Researchers can ask 
judges to describe how they reached their decisions, but they cannot directly trace 
the processes through which the decision was made and measure the relative 
impact of various factors on the final outcome. This is one explanation for the 
difficulty in articulating what exactly is meant by the custody threshold. From a 
legal perspective, Padfield has reached a similar conclusion.76 Padfield argues that 
the courts have explicitly avoided providing an objective definition of the custody 
threshold and thus it is time to stop using the concept.77 It may well be impossible 
to provide an objective or legal definition of the custody threshold. However, that 
does not mean that the term has no significance in sentencing practice or in the 
perceptions of criminal justice actors. 
The idea of a threshold that must be crossed appeals to a common sense idea 
of sentencing. We imagine a scale of seriousness where, at some point on this 
scale, a custodial sanction becomes the only appropriate sanction (at least 
according to the legislative definition). 
My argument here is that the custody threshold is more helpfully 
conceptualized as a shared cultural understanding, rather than a point on a scale. 
Criminal justice actors share an understanding of various types of case that 
require a custodial sanction, even though the headline offense in itself would 
generally be insufficiently serious to require custody. These cases fit somewhere 
in between a set of cases for which custody is inevitable—and any questions are 
about the length of prison sentence—and a set of cases where custody would 
normally be seen as inappropriate and unnecessary. The problem with a cultural 
understanding is that it is not explicit; it is performed through the actions of court 
practitioners but it is not defined or articulated. Providing an objective definition 
of any of these typical case is difficult, arguably impossible, however the custody 
threshold is performed daily in the practices of courtroom actors. So, while the 
custody threshold might be difficult to define objectively, it is a performed reality. 
 
 76.  Padfield, supra note 18, at 610–12. 
 77.  Id. at 612. 
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The challenge is to find a way of articulating the shared cultural understanding 
of the threshold. 
The argument here is that court practitioners share a broad understanding of 
cases that require a short prison sentence. There will not be complete agreement 
between practitioners. The relative impact of the practices of different 
professionals on the production of custody threshold decisions is, of course, an 
empirical question. Stunz has argued that, in the United States of America, 
prosecutors often have a more significant impact on sentencing practices than 
judges.78 The evidence from the empirical studies here suggests that, in Scotland 
too, the charging decisions of the Crown play an important part in framing cases 
on one side or the other of the custody threshold.79 
There will be differences in judgment about whether a particular case fits or 
does not fit the typical case, but this does not challenge the existence of a broadly 
shared understanding. As Hough et al. note, 
It was evident from the ways in which the sentencers described their cusp cases that 
sentencing is not so much a technical or value-neutral process as a value-laden process 
of constructing and exploring the narratives of the lives of the people in the dock.80 
Judges interviewed in a study evaluating the introduction of the Community 
Payback Order were reluctant to define the “custody threshold” but were able 
and willing to reflect on what it meant in practice.81 In one recurring type of case, 
custody was thought to be unavoidable because of the criminal record of the 
offender and, in particular, because of repeated failure to comply with the 
requirements of a community sanction.82 Judges felt that they had to be 
concerned about compliance. Judges saw the persistent breach of community 
sanctions as something that should not be tolerated.83 The public had a right to 
expect that an order of the court would be carried out and that there would be 
consequences for breach of requirements.84 For some judges, this was also a 
matter of asserting the authority of both the court and their personal judicial 
authority. For others, this was a matter of ensuring efficient use of public 
resources. It was seen as wasteful to place an offender on a community order 
where there was little chance of compliance. This was not just a judicial 
 
 78.  See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 595–
99 (2001). 
 79.  See JULIA FIONDA,  TUDYSOMPARATIVE C A :IONISCRETDROSECUTORS AND PUBLIC P 595–99 
(1995) (discussing research that found that the charge prosecutors presented to magistrates often affected 
their sentencing practice). 
 80.  MIKE HOUGH ET AL., THE DECISION TO IMPRISON: SENTENCING AND THE PRISON 
POPULATION 39 (2003). 
 81.  Cf. SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION, supra note 12, at 141–42 (“Although there 
was consensus that a custodial sentence remains a ‘last resort’, there is clearly variation in when Sheriffs 
consider that threshold to have been crossed.”). 
 82.  See id. at 128–29. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See id. at 132. 
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perspective but one shared by social workers.85 Based on the social workers’ 
practices of reporting pervasive non-compliers to judges for further action, there 
may be little to be gained by recommending a community sanction for an 
offender who had demonstrated a repeated inability to comply and where there 
had been no change in circumstances to suggest that a change in behavior was 
likely.86 
Breaches were classified into two main categories: willful non-compliance and 
feckless non-compliance, but both categories would normally result in a custodial 
sentence.87 Willful non-compliers were typically young men who chose not to 
comply with requirements despite being given additional chances to do so. The 
court eventually ran out of patience with offenders who failed to comply. Of 
course, some judges had more patience than others. One Sheriff noted: 
I impose a sentence that I think is apt for the individual offender in the circumstances 
of the crime in the particular moment that I impose it. And if you have somebody who 
has committed even a relatively minor offence, and has been given three opportunities 
to do something else, and has not done it, then you have to sanction them in a way that 
has an impact upon them and on others who might be in that situation. And that doesn’t 
justify sending that individual to prison for six months or more because I’m told that a 
short sentence has no impact. I’m not at that stage trying to engage in the process of 
rehabilitation . . . I’m saying, ‘You were told to do a variety of other things as an option. 
You have not done it. Here is the inevitable consequence.’88 
The feckless non-compliers are typically offenders with chaotic lives, which 
might include homelessness, drug or alcohol addictions, mental health problems, 
or lack of intimate relationships or community ties.89 
[I]f you’ve got people with a transient lifestyle, and we know from history they’re not 
going to be able to respond to a community-based disposal, and . . . the agents are 
generally inviting you to take the view of ‘there’s nothing else we can do.’ . . . That’s 
where a short sentence comes in . . . .90 
These offenders were seen not as deliberately choosing to fail to comply with 
requirements, but as being unable to comply.91 They are seen as lacking control 
of their lives. A community payback order is therefore inappropriate because it 
is wasteful. The risk of non-compliance is very high and the consequence is 
 
 85.  See id. at 110 (stating that judges needed to have confidence in social workers reporting 
breaching people when necessary and that social workers felt “pressure to be seen as tough on non-
compliance”). 
 86.  Cf. id. (indicating that social workers would report breaches non-compliers to the court when a 
continued pattern of refusals to comply signaled that compliance was not possible and warranted “more 
decisive action” by the court against the non-compliers). 
 87.  See id. at 129. 
 88.  Id. (quoting a Sheriff Judge interview). 
 89.  Id. (stating that Sheriffs gave examples of serial non-compliance “rooted in complex and 
overlapping individual problems” instead of willful non-compliance and that, despite greater sympathy 
for the non-compliant party, the short prison sentence is “inevitable” and even “beneficial in the absence 
of appropriate facilities elsewhere”). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. (stating that the serial non-compliance was “rooted in complex and overlapping individual 
problems, such as homelessness, mental ill-health and alcoholism” that prevented compliance). 
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significant extra work for CPO supervisors, social workers, and the court, which 
could and should be avoided. 
Although custody is seen as a last resort for both willful and feckless non-
compliers, the rationale is very different for each. 
A social worker might write a Criminal Justice Social Work Report 
suggesting that despite a poor record of compliance with previous community 
orders, an offender has presented evidence of a new relationship that gives cause 
to think that the offender is now likely to comply with the requirements of a 
community order. 
If you see somebody in that context saying, ‘Yes, we know all of this. We know about 
all of these breaches, but . . .’ And sometimes it can be for all sorts of reasons. It can be 
they’ve done a little bit and they’ve got contact with their family member, they’ve got 
contact with their child again, they’ve got some other . . . something.92 
However, another judge may consider that, notwithstanding the evidence for 
potential change, the record of breach is too serious to risk another community 
order. Judges hold different views on the extent to which the judicial role is to 
enforce compliance or to take what is presented as an opportunity to pursue 
desistance. 
Some sheriffs . . . I think feel much more responsibility or have much more of a . . . not 
a feeling that they’re actually a social worker, but a feeling they’re part of that process; 
whereas other sheriffs feel that they’re not part of that process, that they’re part of a 
different process.93 
B. Sheriff Court Pilot Study 
While data on sentencers’ perceptions of the custody threshold shed some 
light on the nature of the custody threshold, it would be helpful to have more 
data on the cases that receive short prison sentences. Unfortunately, published 
court statistics are not very helpful because they link sentence with principal 
offense, but not with criminal record nor with other information about an 
offender contained in a Criminal Justice Social Work Report. However there was 
a recent, small study in a Scottish Sheriff Court that provides some useful 
insights.94 The research was conducted by the court to provide information for 
the Judicial Institute and has not been published. 
Sheriffs in the study were asked to complete a form for each case where they 
imposed a prison sentence of less than twelve months. The form was a single page 
and contained information about the gender of the offender, the length of 
sentence(s), and the sentencing discount that was granted where relevant. Judges 
were also asked to list their reasons for using a custodial sentence, in order of 
importance. There were five options, and judges were asked to list all that were 
relevant. The provided options were (1) not likely to comply with non-custodial 
 
 92.  Id. at 128. 
 93.  Id. at 131 (quoting a Sheriff judge interview). 
 94.  Neil Hutton, Sheriff Court Pilot Study (Sep. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
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sentence; (2) accused’s previous convictions; (3) incarceration necessary to 
protect the public; (4) suitable community sentence not available; and (5) other 
factors considered by the sentencing judge.95 
There were 31 cases in the two-month period of the research. Just under half 
the offenders were already serving prison sentences; fourteen of the offenders 
were in prison or on license.96 These offenders were being sentenced for offenses 
committed before they entered prison to serve their current sentence. If an 
offender is already in prison, a community sentence is not an option. The court 
will almost always impose a custodial sentence to run consecutively after the end 
of the current sentence or, more commonly, to run concurrently alongside the 
current sentence. The assumption shared by most regular court practitioners 
would be that a prison sentence is highly likely for offenders who are appearing 
from prison. 
A further six offenders were in breach of a court order; one case was a CPO 
and the others were bail orders.97 Where an offender has a significant criminal 
record, custody is highly likely. 
Of the remaining 11 cases, most were for multiple offenses rather than a single 
offense.98 In all of these cases, except in the case involving drug production, 
criminal records were listed by the sentencing judge as a reason for custody 
(usually alongside other reasons).99 
It is difficult to summarize from such a small sample, but one striking factor 
is the high proportion of offenders being sentenced who are already serving a 
prison sentence or are in breach of a bail order. In the remainder of the cases, 
judges identified the presence of criminal record as a reason for the imposition 
of a custodial sentence.100 None of this will come as a surprise to anyone familiar 
with the work of the summary courts. 
The findings provide some support for the interview data. Courts resort to the 
use of short prison sentences in cases where the offender has a significant criminal 
record, much of which relates to non-compliance with various orders of the court. 
Many of these offenders will also have other challenges, mental health issues, 
alcohol or drug misuse, unstable accommodation, unemployment, et cetera.101 
They find themselves caught up in the criminal justice system that is not designed 
to provide the sorts of welfare provisions that many would argue these offenders 
need. 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  See SCOTTISH CRIME AND JUSTICE EVALUATION, supra note 12, at 129 (“Sheriffs gave 
examples of serial non-compliance rooted in complex and overlapping individual problems, such as 
homelessness, mental ill-health and alcoholism. . . . [A] short prison sentence can not only come to be 
seen as inevitable, but even beneficial in the absence of appropriate facilities elsewhere.”). 
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In the criminal court, there comes a time when an unavoidable consequence 
is seen as necessary. For many of these cases, the seriousness of the offense alone 
would not require a custodial sentence. Defining the custody threshold in terms 




Regular summary court practitioners share an unarticulated understanding of 
what the custody threshold means in practice. The question is: what is the most 
appropriate way to articulate the custody threshold? It might be that there are 
too many subjective judgments involved across too many factors to allow courts 
to provide generally applicable descriptions of the threshold. However it is still 
both possible and desirable to provide more useful accounts of when short prison 
sentences are necessary for particular sorts of cases. Rather than drop the term 
custody threshold, sentencing policy should articulate it more clearly. 
The Scottish Government is currently considering raising the presumption 
against short sentences from three months to twelve months.102 This might be 
taken as a clear indication of the government’s desire to reduce the prison 
population in Scotland. It is difficult to predict the impact this will have on 
sentencing practices. It is unlikely to address the perceived need for a custodial 
sentence in certain cases. The government should ask the Scottish Sentencing 
Council to consider developing a guideline to articulate the custody threshold. 
This would raise the interesting issue of whether defining the custody threshold 
should be seen as an attempt to formalize existing practices or develop a new 
policy designed to change existing practices. 
 
 
 102.  SCOTTISH GOV’T, DELIVERING FOR TODAY, INVESTING FOR TOMORROW: THE 
GOVERNMENT’S PROGRAMME FOR SCOTLAND 2018–19 17 (2018) (“In the year ahead the presumption 
against short sentences will be extended to 12 months, once additional safeguards for victims in the 
Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 are in force. We will issue revised guidance and provide additional 
funding for supervised and supported bail to ensure that remand is only used where necessary and 
appropriate.”). 
